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Abstract:  
We present a flexible model of wage dynamics where information about job openings is 
transmitted through social networks. The model is based on Calvó-Armengol & Jackson 
(2004, 2007) and extends their results outside the stationary distribution, and under 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. We present an empirical application using the 
British Household Panel Survey by exploiting direct information about individual’s social 
networks. We find that the distribution of job offers is positively affected by the 
employment status of an individual’s friends, and that this relationship is stronger for 
women. 
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1. Introduction
Many workforce characteristics (such as wages) are determined outside for-
mal market structures. For example, it is estimated that between 18% and 45%
of jobs are found using personal contacts (Pellizzari, 2010). A significant portion
of wage inequality between different groups, and the persistence of this inequal-
ity, may be due to differences in the composition of social networks (Ioannides &
Soetevent, 2006; Fontaine, 2008). Understanding non-market forces governing
employment and wages has been a preoccupation for economists, going back to
Rees (1966), Granovetter (1973, 1983) and Montgomery (1991, 1992).
In this paper, we present a flexible framework for analyzing how non-market
institutions (e.g. peer referrals) affect wages. Our contribution is twofold.
First, we contribute to the theoretical literature on network effects in the labour
market (e.g. Calvo´-Armengol & Zenou (2005), Cahuc & Fontaine (2009) and
Fontaine (2008)) by extending the results of Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson (2004,
2007). Specifically, we show that a natural extension of their results holds
outside the stationary distribution, and under observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity. Second, we present an empirical application using data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 1992 to 2008, where we exploit direct in-
formation on individuals’ friendship networks and the employment status of
their friends. We find that the number of employed friends has a significant
positive impact on the distribution of job offers (and therefore on wages), and
that this effect is stronger for women.
We build on the important contribution of Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson (2004,
2007) by extending their model to include observed and unobserved heterogene-
ity. In contrast with most of the literature,1 our results also hold outside the
stationary distribution. This is empirically important since periods of interest
often include short-term events such as recessions.
We find that the individuals’ wages dynamic is associated. This implies that,
1See Ioannides & Loury (2004) for an extensive review of the literature on social networks
and the labour market.
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conditional on the observables, the wages of any two individuals are positively
correlated, across any point in time. We also show that, as time passes, this de-
pendence is strict for any two socially connected individuals, and that the speed
at which this dependence spreads can be expressed as a function of the social
network. This allows us to describe the impact of a shock to an individual’s
wage on the overall distribution of wages, at any point in time.
We restrict our analysis to a time-invariant network and we abstract away
from strategic network formation considerations, such as in Calvo´-Armengol
(2004) and Galeotti & Merlino (2014). However, our empirical strategy controls
for part of the potential network endogeneity.2
We present an empirical application using data from the BHPS from 1992 to
2008. We develop a non-linear dynamic spatial autoregressive (DSAR) model
and show that it constitutes a special case of our general framework. An im-
portant feature of our model is that an individual’s wage is not only dependent
on his position in the network, but also on the employment status of the other
individuals in the network. We model the dependence on the initial state using
random effects, as in Wooldridge (2005).
We find that the number of employed friends an individual has at time t
has a positive impact on his wage at time t + 1, and that this effect is much
stronger for women. This result is in line with findings of stronger peer-effects
for women (Dieye & Fortin, 2014; Neumark & Postlewaite, 1998). Our find-
ings could be explained by better communication and greater solidarity among
women, which complements previous interpretations in other contexts, such as
social conformism or complementarities. Our findings enrich the existing liter-
ature (e.g. Ibarra (1992), Campbell (1988), Hanson & Pratt (1991) and Mar-
maros & Sacerdote (2002)) that find that women’s job networks are relatively
“poor” as compared to men’s (lower density and “quality”) and that social net-
works contribute to the gender gap in wages and promotions. We find that a
small increase in connections to employed individuals has a stronger effect on
2See also our discussion in section 4.
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employment outcomes for women than for men.
We contribute to the empirical literature on the effects of networks on the
labour market (e.g. Ioannides & Soetevent (2006)). There are still relatively few
empirical works looking at friendship networks. This is mostly due to lack of
detailed data. Existing studies use either information on close neighbourhoods
(Bayer et al., 2009), or on co-workers’ networks (Cingano & Rosolia, 2012; Dust-
mann et al., 2011; A˚slund et al., 2014). Kramarz & Skans (2014) analyze the
effect of strong family ties on young workers’ success in finding jobs. Galeotti &
Merlino (2014) use data on friends and relatives, although they do not observe
their employment status.
We use the information provided by the BHPS, which contains direct in-
formation about individuals’ friendship networks and the employment status of
their friends. To our knowledge, Cappellari & Tatsiramos (2011) is the only pa-
per exploiting this data in a similar fashion. Using a static linear instrumental
variables approach, they find that having one more employed friend increases
an individual’s probability of being employed by 12%. We complement and ex-
tend their analysis by proposing a structural non-linear DSAR model in which
friends’ wages are correlated across time. Our analysis also complements Aru-
lampalam & Stewart (2009), who also use the BHPS in order to estimate the
dynamics of wages and employment using a similar methodology. We enrich
their findings by including the impact of the friendship network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the microeconomic framework. In section 3, we present our structural econo-
metric model. We conclude in section 4.
2. Wage Distributions with Network Effects
We consider an economy composed of a finite set of individuals, N . Each
individual i ∈ N is characterized by a time-varying type [xti, εti], where xti is
observed, but not εti. Typically, x
t
i will include socio-economic characteristics
such as the individual’s gender, level of education, and age. We assume that
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the εt are independent and identically distributed across time only, so εti and ε
t
j
may be correlated for a given period of time t. Individuals interact in a time-
invariant social network represented by the matrix Gs, such that gsij = 1 if i and
j are linked, and gsij = 0 otherwise. For instance, G
s may represent friendships
(Galeotti & Merlino, 2014) or family ties (Kramarz & Skans, 2014). We denote
by Ns(i) = {j ∈ N : gsij = 1} the set of nsi individuals linked to i (i.e. the set
of i’s peers). We also denote by ρs(i, j) the shortest path between i and j. The
shortest path is the minimum number of links needed to reach j from i. If it is
not possible to reach j from i, we let ρs(i, j) =∞. If ρs(i, j) <∞, we say that
i and j are “socially connected.” At every period t = 0, 1, ..., each individual
earns a wage wti ∈W ≡ [b,∞), where b ≥ 0 is interpreted as social welfare.3
We assume that the evolution of wages can be described as follows:
wt+1 = ϕ(wt,Xt, εt) (1)
A simple example of (1) is a standard AR(1) process: wt+1i = ρw
t
i + x
t
iβ + ε
t
i.
However, we are interested in a wider variety of economic situations. We present
a motivating example below (see Example 1).
It will sometimes be convenient (as in Example 1) to describe the distribution
of wages using probability measures. We can denote the conditional probability
of A ∈ Bn at t+ 1, given wt and Xt as P (wt,Xt;A), where Bn is the standard
Borel set on W ⊂ Rn.4 We also define inductively
P t+1(w0, (Xt);A) =
∫
W
P (w,Xt;A)P (w0, (Xt−1); dw)
where we use the short-hand notation (Xt) ≡ (X0, ...,Xt). Also note that
since (Xt) is observed, the conditional probability P (wt,Xt;A) defines a non-
homogeneous Markov chain. If we further assume that Xt = X for all t,
the model reduces to a standard (homogeneous) Markov chain, as in Calvo´-
3We assume that wages include any non-monetary benefit or cost associated with an indi-
vidual’s job, so preferences are strictly increasing in wages.
4Note that P does not depend on t since the εt are independent and identically distributed.
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Figure 1: (Example 1) Fix wti , and let F
t
i represent the cumulative distribution of (direct
and indirect) offers for i at time t (so γ is implicitly embedded in F ti ). The probability that
i becomes unemployed is equal to the probability that he gets laid off and that he does not
receive any job offer, i.e. δF ti (b). The “jump” observed at w
t
i is equal to the probability that
the individual keeps his current job, which is equal to the probability that he does not get laid
off, and that he receives an offer that is less than wti , i.e. (1− δ)F ti (wti).
Armengol & Jackson (2004, 2007).
Example 1. We present a motivating example for Equation 1. Suppose that,
at every period t, the economy is described by the following phases:
1. Each individual is laid off with probability δ ∈ (0, 1).
2. Each individual receives a job offer with probability γ ∈ (0, 1). The dis-
tribution of offers follows a (shifted) log-normal distribution Λ(µi, σ) + b,
where µi = ln (αw
t
i + (1− α)xi) for α ∈ (0, 1). Here, xi can be interpreted
as the individual’s natural capacity to attract job offers. The dependence
on wti can be interpreted as the signalling effect of the individual’s current
job to potential employers.
3. Offers are either accepted or further transmitted through the network.
(a) If the offer is less than an individual’s current wage, the individual
selects one of his peers (independently of his peers’ current wages)
and sends him the offer.
(b) If the offer is greater than the individual’s current wage, the individ-
ual accepts the offer (and quits his existing job). He then selects one
of his peers (independently of his peers’ current wages) and transfers
him an offer for his former job.
The fact that xti = xi for all t implies that the dynamics of the economy can be
described by a homogeneous Markov chain with transition kernel PX(w;A). The
marginal cumulative distribution of wt+1i for a given individual i ∈ N earning
wti at time t is displayed in Figure 1.
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Note that the specification of the dynamics of wages in Equation 1 will
generally impose some restrictions on individual rationality. In Example 1, for
instance, we assume that individuals accept any job offer that pays a higher
wage. This decision is clearly rational in the short run. However, it may be
possible that accepting a highly paid job today reduces the prospect of finding
an even better paying job in the future. In this case, the naive decision process
described in Example 1 would not be rational in the long run. We abstract from
these effects by assuming that an increase in wages cannot reduce an individual’s
future wage prospects.5 Formally:
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity). ϕ(wt,Xt, εt) is increasing in wt and εt.
An equivalent interpretation of Assumption 1 is the following: increasing wages
today leads to a better distribution of wages tomorrow, in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance (FOSD).6 Let  represent dominance in the sense
of FOSD. Then, we have the following:
Lemma 1. Assumption 1 holds iff P (w,X;A)  P (w˜,X;A) whenever w ≥ w˜.
A reference for this lemma can be found in the appendix. Lemma 1 is also useful
in order to show that Assumption 1 holds for specific economies, as shown in
Example 2.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Consider the economy described in Ex-
ample 1.7
Suppose that we increase current wages. The properties of the log-normal
distribution imply that this results in an increase to the wage distribution of
direct offers for the next period, in the sense of FOSD. Since indirect offers are
increasing in direct offers and current wages, it also increases the distribution
of indirect offers.
Since future wages are increasing in direct offers, indirect offers and current
wages, this results in an increase in the distribution of future wages.
5Note that this assumption imposes more than monotonicity with respect to an individual’s
wage, as it is also increasing in other individuals’ wages. This assumption is also implicitly
present in Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson (2004) (lemma 8) and Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson
(2007) (lemma A.4).
6Recall that w is greater than w′ in the sense of FOSD iff Eu(w) ≥ Eu(w′) for any
non-decreasing bounded function u.
7See the appendix for a formal proof of this discussion.
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Note, as discussed above, that the monotonicity of the stochastic process pro-
vides a rationale for individuals’ behaviour. Since higher wages cannot decrease
the distribution of future wages, it is rational for individuals to choose the job
with the highest wage.
Since the wage dynamics are monotone, the increase in some individual’s
wage has a non-negative impact on every individual’s wage. However, the effect
might not be strict and some individuals’ wages may be independent. The
dependence structure of wt is affected by the shape of ϕ, as well as by the
dependence structure of εt. In the next section, we discuss the dependence
structure of the wage distribution.
2.1. Dependence Structure
We first introduce our notion of positive dependence.
Definition 1 (Association). Consider the random vector w. We say that w
is associated if
Cov(a(w), c(w)) ≥ 0
for all non-decreasing functions a and c.
In particular, letting a(w) = wi and c(w) = wj for some i, j ∈ N , we have
the following corollary: if w is associated, then Cov(wi, wj) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈
N . Association has been used in a very similar context by Calvo´-Armengol &
Jackson (2004, 2007). We assume the following:
Assumption 2. εt is associated for all t.
In particular, Assumption 2 implies that unobserved shocks are positively cor-
related across individuals. Note that the case where the εti are independent is
a special case. An important consequence of this assumption (together with
Assumption 1) is the following:
Proposition 2 (Association). Suppose that w0 is associated and that As-
sumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, (wt)|(Xt−1) is associated, for all t.
This result follows directly from the literature on monotone stochastic processes
(references are provided in the appendix). Recall that (wt) = (w0, ...,wt), so
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Proposition 2 implies that association holds for any two individuals, across any
points in time.
However, Proposition 2 includes two unwanted features. First, it only de-
scribes weak dependence, since any two independent variables are necessarily
associated. Second, it depends on the initial state w0, which may be unknown
in practice. We address these issues below.
We assume the following technical assumption, which will be convenient in
order to simplify the exposition of the model:8
Assumption 3 (Positive Distribution). For any w,X, P (w,X;A) > 0 for
all strictly positive A ∈ Bn.
Note that Assumption 3 holds for Example 1.
We now describe the dependence structure of the wage distribution. Specif-
ically, we want to know which individuals’ wages are dependent, and which are
not. It will be useful to describe the dependence of the stochastic process using
a network structure. However, that network structure may not be the same as
the social network structure Gs. We assume that the dependence structure can
be summarized as follows:
Assumption 4 (Dependence Network). There exists a network Gd, called
the “dependence network,” which is the smallest network such that for all i ∈ N :
wt+1i |wt+1−i ,wt,Xt = wt+1i |wt+1Nd(i),wtNd(i)∪{i},xti
Assumption 4 describes two important features of the model. First, the depen-
dence network characterizes the dependence structure of the wage distribution
at any point in time. Note that this is done without any loss of generality, since
Gd can be the complete network. Also note that Gd is stable through time,
since the εt are independent and identically distributed. Second, the model is
limited to endogenous interactions: an individual is not affected by his peers’
types, only by their wages.9
8See proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, in the appendix, for details.
9Note that one can always define xi as [xˆi, XˆNd(i)] for some initial matrix Xˆ. In this case,
however, any change in Gd leads to a change in X. Assumption 4 allows us to abstract from
these unwanted effects.
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Note that even if Gs and Gd need not be related, the dependence network
will often turn out be a function of the social network. Example 3 highlights
the differences between Gs and Gd.
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). Consider the economy described in Ex-
ample 1. We have Gs = Gd since the distribution of (indirect) offers is only
a function of the wages of individuals’ peers. Put differently, future wages of
unlinked individuals are not correlated, conditional on current wages. However,
suppose that the network phase is repeated as follows:
3. Offers are either accepted or further transmitted through the network.
(a) If the offer is less than an individual’s current wage, the individual
selects one of his peers (independently of his peers’ current wages)
and sends him the offer.
(b) If the offer is greater than the individual’s current wage, the indi-
vidual accepts the direct offer (and quits his existing job). He then
selects one of his peers (independently of his peers’ current wages)
and transfers him an offer for his former job.
(c) Steps (a) and (b) are repeated (for indirect offers) until no offer is
accepted.
Contrary to the original game in Example 1, indirect offers can be transmitted
through the network (individuals can re-send unwanted offers). Then, the wage
distribution of an individual’s offers is a function of the wages of their peers,
their peers’ peers, and so on. Then, the wages of any two socially connected
individuals are dependent, i.e. Gdij = 1 iff ρ
s(i, j) <∞, so Gs ⊂ Gd.
An implication of Assumption 4 is that the distance in the dependence net-
work allows us to describe how fast shocks (e.g. information) spread in the
economy. Formally:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 3 and 4,
(wti ⊥ wtj)|w0, (Xt−1) iff ρd(i, j) > t
See the appendix for a proof. Since the dependence network characterizes the
dependence of wt, the shortest path in the dependence network allows us to
describe how many periods are needed in order for a shock to spread from
one individual to another. Note that if the dependence network is such that
ρd(i, j) < ∞ iff ρs(i, j) < ∞ for all i 6= j, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the
wages of any socially connected individuals are strictly associated after some
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finite amount of time.10
Note, however, that Proposition 3 suffers from the same limitation as Propo-
sition 2: the dependence on the initial state, w0. We now provide sufficient
conditions for the dependence on w0 to vanish asymptotically. We assume the
following:
Assumption 5 (Layoff Probability). There exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
δ ≤ P (w,X; b)
for all w,X.
This last assumption ensures the recurrence of the stochastic process at state
b. Note that Assumption 5 holds for Example 1, since P (w,X; b) ≥ (1−γ)nδn
for all w,X.
Let us define the “total variation norm” as ‖P‖ = 2 supA⊆W |P (A)|. Then,
the next proposition follows. (See the appendix for a proof.)
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 3 and 5, and for any w0 and w˜0:
‖P t(w˜0, (Xt−1); ·)− P t(w0, (Xt−1); ·)‖ → 0
as t → ∞. Moreover, if Xt = X for all t, there exists a unique probability
measure pi such that for any w0:
‖P t(w0,X; ·)− pi‖ → 0
as t→∞.
When Xt is time dependent, the model may not have a stationary distribution.
However, as t→∞, the dependence on the initial state vanishes. When Xt = X
for all t, the model does have a stationary distribution, pi.
The next corollary follows from Propositions 2, 3 and 4, and summarizes the
economic significance of this section’s results.
Corollary 1. Suppose that ρd(i, j) < ∞ iff ρs(i, j) < ∞ for all i 6= j and that
Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Then,
(wti ⊥ wtj)|(Xt−1)
10This generalizes Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson (2004) (Proposition 1) and Calvo´-Armengol
& Jackson (2007) (Theorem 1), where they present results for the stationary distribution of a
homogeneous Markov chain.
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as t→∞ iff i and j are not socially connected. Moreover, as t→∞, wt|(Xt−1)
becomes associated.
The assumption that ρd(i, j) <∞ iff ρs(i, j) <∞ reflects the fact that the social
network has an influence on the dependence structure of the wage distribution
(see Example 2). Since the dependence on the initial state vanishes as t → ∞
(see Proposition 4), Propositions 2 and 3 hold irrespective of the initial state as
t→∞.
This completes the analysis of the dependence structure of the model. In
the next section, we study the comparative dynamics of the model.
2.2. The Impacts of Shocks on Wage Dynamics
In this section, we discuss the impact of changes in Xt on the distributions
of wages. We assume the following:
Assumption 6. ϕ(w,X, ε) is increasing in X.
This implies that X has a positive impact (in the sense of FOSD; see Lemma
1) on the distribution of future wages. It implies the following:
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and let Xt ≥ X˜t. Then,
w0  w˜0 implies that wt|(Xt−1)  w˜t|(X˜t−1) for all t.
Proposition 5 follows from standard results for the comparison of monotone
stochastic processes (see the appendix for a proof and references). Note that
under the conditions of Proposition 4, the dependence on the initial state van-
ishes as t→∞. Note also that Proposition 5 can be applied to Example 1 with
Xt = x.11
Suppose that Xt represents individuals’ levels of education. This implies
that increasing the level of education of some individual i will have a positive
impact on the entire distribution of wages. Coupled with Corollary 1, it implies
that the increase in i’s level of education will have, for a sufficiently large t, a
positive impact on any individual socially connected to i, and no impact on the
rest of the population.
11Another example is the drop-out functions from Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson (2004)
(Proposition 4) and Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson (2007) (Theorem 2).
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Note that in principle, Proposition 5 could be applied to changes in the net-
work structure. Suppose that Gs ⊇ G˜s implies that ϕGs(w,X, ε) ≥ ϕG˜s(w,X, ε).
That is, adding links to the social network has a positive impact on the wage dis-
tribution at a given time. Then, Proposition 5 implies that this dominance holds
for all t. Such an assumption may represent situations where the information
transmitted through the network is non-rival. For example, individuals may
gain information from their peers about how to access government programs
or evade taxes (Bellemare et al., 2012). The key is that when information is
non-rival, everyone benefits from an individual having more links.
However, if the information transmitted through the network is rival (for
example, information about a particular job opening, as in Example 1), the
addition of a link will usually be beneficial to some, but detrimental to others.
In Example 1, individuals prefer to have many links since it increases the prob-
ability that they receive indirect job offers. However, they prefer to be linked
(all else equal) to individuals with relatively few links, as it increases the proba-
bility that such an individual will transmit an (indirect) offer to them, and not
to another peer. Increasing the number of links will therefore have ambiguous
effects on the wage distribution.
This completes the analysis of the theoretical framework. In the next section,
we present our empirical application.
3. A Coherent Structural Econometric Model
We now discuss our ability to estimate the model developed in the previous
sections. Although there is nothing that conceptually prevents the estimation of
models such as the one presented in Example 1, the availability of data prevents
the identification of such models. One would have to observe the entire network
structure, as well as the offers transmitted.
An alternative would be to use existing econometric models such as linear
DSAR models (Baltagi et al., 2014), where:
ln(wt+1) = Xβ + λGs ln(wt+1) + ρ ln(wt) + εt+1
12
Note that this linear DSAR model is monotone, and that Assumption 3 holds.12
However, the linearity of the model has many unwanted features.
First, individuals’ wages are negatively (and symmetrically) influenced by
peers with lower wages (through λGs ln(wt+1)). This is incompatible with
an interpretation of peer effects in terms of information transmission. Second,
there is no well-defined unemployment level. Third, the model features too much
variation in wages, compared to what is observed. In particular, the probability
that an individual keeps the same wage for two consecutive periods is 0 if ε
is drawn from a continuous distribution. Finally, as in Example 1, it requires
detailed knowledge of the social network and of the wage distribution for the
entire population.
We therefore propose the following model, which does not have the unwanted
features of the linear DSAR, but can be identified using available data.
3.1. The Econometric Model
We assume that every period is characterized by the following phases:
1. Each individual is laid off with probability δ ∈ (0, 1).
2. Each individual receives a job offer with probability γ ∈ (0, 1). Let
ω(Xt,wt) be the distribution of offers. Assume that it follows a log-
normal distribution,
lnωt+1i = x
t
iβ + λ ln(w
t
i) + τE
t
i + ε
t
i
where Eti is the number of i’s peers who are employed at time t, with
λ, τ > 0 and εti is normally distributed. We assume that:
(a) If the direct offer received is less than the individual’s current wage,
the individual keeps his current job
(b) If the direct offer received is larger than the individual’s current wage,
the individual accepts the job offer
12Also note that even if Assumption 5 does not hold, the linear DSAR is stationary, provided
conditions on λ are met.
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Note that, contrary to Example 1, the network effects are directly embedded in
the distribution of offers, which allows for the identification and estimation of
the model. Note that we can write i’s wage at t+ 1 as follows:
ln(wt+1i ) = (1−Dδ)Dγ max
{
0,
(
xtiβ + (λ− 1) ln(wti) + τEti + εti
)}
(2)
+ DδDγ max
{
0,
(
xtiβ + λ ln(w
t
i)− ln(b) + τEti + εti
)}
+ (1−Dδ) ln(wti) +Dδ ln(b)
where Dp denotes the (Bernouilli distributed) random variable that takes a value
of 1 with probability p, and 0 otherwise.
We obtain a dynamic nonlinear panel data model that we can estimate using
actual data. Such a model needs some additional assumptions to deal with
the initial condition issue. Specifically, we do not observe the initial state,
but it is likely to be correlated with individuals’ unobserved characteristics.
To our knowledge, there is no transformation that controls for unobservable
individual fixed effects in non-linear settings. We therefore use the estimation
method proposed by Wooldridge (2005) and assume the following random effects
model:13
εti = αi + u
t
i,
where uti ∼ N (0, σu).
We then model the random effect as a function of the initial conditions.
Specifically:
αi = a1 lnw
0
i + ηi,
where ηi ∼ N (0, ση) and w0i is i’s initial wage.
To provide more flexibility in the specification of the conditional distribu-
tion of the unobserved effect, we allow αi to be correlated with the exogenous
regressors over all the periods. To this end, we use the Mundlak specification
13Arulampalam & Stewart (2009) compare three parametric estimation methods to ad-
dress initial condition issues in non-linear dynamic settings: the Heckman method, the Orme
method and the Woolridge method. They do not find one to be clearly superior to the others.
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of correlated random effects (CRE) (Mundlak, 1978):
αi = a1 lnw
0
i + ziρ+ ηi,
where zi = (x¯i1, ..., x¯iK , lnw
0
i × x¯i1, ..., lnw0i × x¯iK) is a vector of the means
of the exogenous regressors over all the periods and their interaction with the
initial state.
Then, we can write the contribution of the likelihood of observing wt+1i con-
ditional on wti , E
t
i , w
0
i , on the exogenous regressors x
t
i and zi, on the unobserved
heterogeneity ηi and on all the parameters of the model. Using Equation 2, we
define five probabilities: the probability that the individual receives an offer
between t and t + 1 that is superior to his wage in t (wt+1i > w
t
i), the proba-
bility that the individual is both working at t and t+ 1 at the same wage rate
(wt+1i = w
t
i |wti > b), the probability that the individual is unemployed both in t
and in t+ 1 and earns social welfare wt+1i = w
t
i |wti = b, the probability that the
individual has lost his job at t but simultaneously receives a job offer for t + 1
that is inferior to his wage in t but still superior to the social welfare b and that
he accepts (wt+1i < w
t
i |wt+1i > b), and finally the probability that the individual
loses his job without finding a new one between t and t+ 1 (wt+1i = b|wti > b).
Then, the conditional contribution of individual i to the likelihood at time t+ 1
15
can be written as:
Lt+1i = L(w
t+1
i |wti , Eti , w0i , ηi,xti, zi, θ) (3)
=
[
γ
σu
φ
(
ln(wt+1i )−
(
xtiβ + λ ln(w
t
i) + τE
t
i + a1 lnw
0
i + ziρ+ ηi
)
σu
)]1{wt+1i >wti}
×
[
(1− δ)(1− γ) + (1− δ)γΦ
(
−x
t
iβ + (λ− 1) ln(wti) + τEti + a1 lnw0i + ziρ+ ηi
σu
)]1{wt+1i =wti |wti>b}
×
[
(1− γ) + γΦ
(
−x
t
iβ + (λ− 1) ln(wti) + τEti + a1 lnw0i + ziρ+ ηi
σu
)]1{wt+1i =wti |wti=b}
×
[
δγ
σu
φ
(
ln(wt+1i )−
(
xtiβ + λ ln(w
t
i) + τE
t
i + a1 lnw
0
i + ziρ+ ηi
)
σu
)]1{wt+1i <wti |wt+1i >b}
×
[
δ(1− γ) + δγΦ
(
−x
t
iβ + λ ln(w
t
i)− ln(b) + τEti + a1 lnw0i + ziρ+ ηi
σu
)]1{wt+1i =b|wti>b}
with φ and Φ denoting, respectively, the probability and cumulative density
functions of the standard normal distribution.
Then, we integrate out ηi to obtain the conditional contribution of individual
i to the likelihood of the model that is the density of (w1i , w
2
i , ..., w
T
i ) given
(w0i ,xi, zi, Ei, θ):
L((w1i , w
2
i , ..., w
T
i )|w0i ,xi, zi, Ei, θ) =
∫ ( T∏
t=1
L(wti |wt−1i , Et−1i , w0i , ηi,xi, zi, θ)
)
1
ση
φ(ηi)dη
where the integral will be computed using the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature.
Then, we sum the log transformation of each contribution over all individuals
to obtain the log-likelihood of the model:
L =
N∑
i=1
ln
[∫ ( T∏
t=1
L(wti |wt−1i , Et−1i , w0i , ηi,xi, zi, θ)
)
1
ση
φ(ηi)dη
]
. (4)
One could argue that the random effect corrects for the endogeneity of wt−1i ,
but not for the possible endogeneity of the number of employed peers, Et−1i .
As a robustness check, we estimate a joint model for the wage dynamics and
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the number of employed friends where we permit correlated random effects on
two endogenous variables (an individual’s number of employed peers and his
previous wage).14 That is, we add to the previous estimation an ordered probit
model of the number of employed peers:
ln(wt+1i ) = fw(w
t
i , E
t
i , w
0
i ,x
t
i, zi, ηi, θ, u
t
i)
Et+1i = 0 if e0w
t
i + e1E
t
i + x
t
2ie+ νi + u
t
2i < a0
= 1 if a0 ≤ e0wti + e1Eti + xt2ie+ νi + ut2i < a1
= 2 if a1 ≤ e0wti + e1Eti + xt2ie+ νi + ut2i < a2
= 3 if a2 ≤ e0wti + e1Eti + xt2ie+ νi + ut2i
where the random effects νi and ηi are jointly normally distributed with vari-
ances σν and ση, and correlation ρ. The errors (u
t
i, u
t
2i) are assumed to be
independent and normally distributed, with variances σu to be estimated and
σu2 fixed at 1.
Note that this model is compatible with the framework developed in Section
2:
Proposition 6. The econometric model respects Assumptions 1 to 5, and such
that Gd = Gs.
A proof is provided in the appendix. In particular, note that the conditions of
Proposition 5 hold so that any change in the parameters driving the distribution
of offers (i.e. β, λ and τ) does not only have an impact on the expected wage,
but on the entire distribution of future wages.15
We now briefly present the data.
3.2. Data
We use the BHPS, covering the period 1991-2008, to examine the wage
dynamics of British men and women. This panel is a nationally representative
14Stewart (2007) also estimates a joint bivariate probit model with correlated error terms
and random effects.
15See the proof of Proposition 6 in the appendix for details with respect to FOSD.
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sample of households whose members are re-interviewed each year.
The sample is restricted to 18- to 65-year-olds who are in the labour force
during the whole period (we thus exclude retired individuals, full-time students
and individuals in family care). We drop all observations with missing informa-
tion on usual gross pay per month and the number of hours normally worked per
week. We trim the top and bottom 1% tails of wages and working hours, and
we compute the hourly wage by dividing the usual gross pay per month by the
number of hours normally worked per month. Finally, wages are deflated by the
consumer price index and computed in 2008 British pounds. We also observe
the year in which individuals begin their current job. We use that information
to identify changes in wages between two periods that come from a job offer or
termination, and not from measurement errors or salary raises.
For all individuals, we observe their education level, age, marital status and
the employment status of their three best friends. The survey also collects
information on individuals’ health status, which we use as a dummy variable
indicating whether the health of an individual limits the type or amount of
work he could perform. Finally, we add the regional unemployment rate for
each period to the panel.16 As information on friends is only collected in even-
numbered years, we restrict our sample to those years (1992, 1994, ..., 2006,
2008) so that we consider nine periods of two years.
We keep observations for individuals who provide information on at least
one friend each year; we obtain a balanced panel of 956 individuals (8,604 ob-
servations). Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
3.3. Results
Estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 3. We compare three
models: one with uncorrelated random effects where initial conditions are as-
sumed to be exogenous, a second with uncorrelated random effects where we
16Twelve regions are reported: North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East
Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland.
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include a dependency to the initial wage, and a third with correlated random
effects and a dependency to the initial conditions.17
We find a job destruction rate (δ) of 15% and a rate of offers (γ) of 65%.
The probability of being unemployed in a given period is then approximately
5.2% (0.15× (1− 0.65)), which is slightly lower then the unemployment rate in
the UK during this time period.18 Also note that the rate of offers represents
any offers, and not necessarily offers that are accepted, which accounts for the
relatively high rate.
We find a significant dependency on the initial conditions, implying that the
wage dependence persists over 16 years. This is reflected by the fact that the
impact on an individual’s wage at time t has a large and statistically significant
impact on the distribution of new offers at time t+ 1.
When we take random effects into account, and then allow for correlated
random effects, the effect of the current wage on the distribution of offers de-
creases slightly. However, we still find a small but positive and significant effect
of the current wage on the average distribution of job offers. A 10% increase
in the current wage increases the average wage of an individual’s job offers by
by 0.8%. There is a significant impact of the number of employed friends in
the third model (column 3 of Table 3). Having an additional employed friend
increases the average wage of an individual’s job offers by by 2.8%. Not surpris-
ingly, a high unemployment rate, poor health conditions, being single, having
minimal education and being female all have a negative effect on the distribution
of job offers.
We further compare the results with those obtained when we estimate the
model for women only. Wage dynamics are very gender dependent, so separate
estimations may be more relevant. Furthermore, we observe greater variability
for women than for men with respect to the number of employed friends an
17Correlated random effects are computed by including the means of the exogenous variables
over the periods and their interactions with the initial wage.
18A precise calculation of the probability of being unemployed would include the probability
that an individual receives an offer that they refuse.
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individual has.19 Results are displayed in Table 4. In the two first columns, we
present the results for individuals who give information on each of their three
best friends (for women in the first column and for all individuals in the second
column). Estimates are very close to the previous results but show a stronger
effect of the network on women’s wages. For women, having one more employed
friend increases the average offer by 4% instead of 2.8% for all individuals.
In the last two columns, we add individuals who provide information on only
one or two friends. The network effect stays positive and significant for women,
whereas it almost disappears when we include men. Whereas gender differences
in the density and composition of social networks have been studied in the
literature (Ioannides & Loury, 2004), it would also be interesting to understand
gender differences in the use and the efficiency of social contacts for improving
labour-market outcomes.
Finally, we estimate a joint model for wage dynamics and for the number
of friends employed. Results are presented in Table 5. The estimation is for
women only.20 We find a stronger effect of the network. Other coefficients are
remarkably stable. Our estimation of the correlation between the two random
effects is not statistically significant.
We conclude by discussing areas for further research.
4. Conclusion
The empirical literature on the effects of personal networks in the labour
market is small but expanding. We contribute to that literature by proposing
a non-linear DSAR and estimating the impact of the employment status of
an individual’s three best friends on the distribution of his job offers. Our
structural econometric model is based on our general microeconomic framework,
19More than 65% of employed men have their three best friends employed, compared with
45% for employed women.
20The results are qualitatively the same for the whole sample. Results are available upon
request.
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which allows for a large variety of econometric specifications. We discuss some
examples below.
We find that the number of employed friends has a positive effect on the
distribution of job offers. This finding is important, as it introduces dependence
between individuals’ wages. It also suggests that information about the status
of an individual’s peers can be as relevant as the information about the peers
themselves.
An interesting finding is that the employment status of an individual’s peers
has a larger effect on the distribution of job offers for women than for men. This
suggests that certain groups of individuals (in this case, women) can be more
affected by negative shocks on their peers. Determining which groups are more
or less exposed to the status of their peers is a promising area of research.
Another potential area for future research (which may be constrained by
a lack of available data) is to study the spread of negative aggregate shocks.
Our general framework allows for the study of wage dynamics outside the sta-
tionary distribution. The fact that wages are positively correlated points to a
multiplicative effect of recessions: the total impact is a combination of both the
direct impact of a shock, as well as the indirect impact that occurs through the
employment status of individuals’ peers.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the social network structure is fixed
and independent of wage dynamics. This is consistent with our empirical appli-
cation, since wages are unlikely to be a significant determinant of close friend-
ships. However, some networks (e.g. co-workers) are much more likely to be
determined as a function of labour-market outcomes. This raises interesting
and challenging questions as to the extent to which individuals are strategic in
choosing their friends in time-varying endogenous social networks.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Proofs
Proof (of Lemma 1). See Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002), theorem 5.2.3.
Proof (of the Discussion in Example 2). From Lemma 1, it is sufficient
to show that wt ≥ wˆt implies that wt+1  wˆt+1. The direct offers are given
by:
ωti = Dγ(αw
t
i + (1− α)xi) exp{εti}+ b
where εti is independent and identically distributed from N(0, σ
2) and Dγ is a
Bernoulli distributed random variable that takes a value of 1 with probability γ.
Note that wt ≥ wˆt implies that ωt  ωˆt (see Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002), theorems
3.3.10, 3.3.11 and 3.3.13). We can define the following:
ri = max{Dδb+ (1−Dδ)wti , ωti}
and
si = min{Dδb+ (1−Dδ)wti , ωti}
where Dδ is a Bernoulli distributed random variable that takes value 1 with
probability δ. Therefore, wt ≥ wˆt implies that r  rˆ and s  sˆ (see Mu¨ller &
Stoyan (2002), theorem 3.3.10). Finally, we have that
wt+1 = max{r, s1d1, ..., sndn}
so, (again from Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002), theorem 3.3.10), we have that wt ≥ wˆt
implies that wt+1  wˆt+1. QED
Proof (of Proposition 2). See Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002), theorem 3.10.7 and
theorem 4.3.13.
Proof (of Proposition 3). The proof is based on the theory of independen-
cies for Markov network models. The reference used here is Koller & Friedman
(2009), section 4.3.
Let us consider the set of all wages, for all individuals, at any point in time
from t = 0 to t = T , conditional on the characteristics Xt, i.e. {wt1, ..., wTn |(XT−1)}.
We now define a Markov network structure. Let H be an undirected graph
where a typical node is (i, t) for i ∈ N and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Consider (i, t) and (j, τ)
in H. We set τ ≥ t without a loss of generality. We assume that a link exists
between (i, t) and (j, τ) if one of the following conditions holds:
1. i = j and τ = t− 1
2. j ∈ Nd(i) and τ = t− 1
3. j ∈ Nd(i) and τ = t
We provide an example in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Markov Network
Given an arbitrary graph G on (i, t), the Markov blanket of a generic random
variable Z = {zti} is defined as:
I(G) = {(zti ⊥ Z− {zτj }(j,τ),(i,t)∈G − zti)|{zτj }(j,τ),(i,t)∈G}
Conditional on the neighbours of (i, t) in G, the realizations on zti are indepen-
dent of the other variables in Z.
In the context of {wt1, ..., wTn |(XT−1)} and H, Assumption 4 implies that H
summarizes the dependence structure of zti ≡ wti |(Xt−1). Since Assumption 3
holds, looking at the Markov blanket is sufficient to describe the dependence
structure (see Koller & Friedman (2009), corollary 4.1).
For instance, in the example in Figure 2, we see that w1i and w
1
l are in-
dependent, conditional on w0, (X0) (i.e. there is no path between (i, 1) and
(j, 1)). However, there are paths between, say, (j, 2) and (l, 2). More impor-
tantly, there is at least one path between (j, 2) and (l, 2) that does not pass
through [(i, 0), (j, 0), (k, 0), (l, 0)]: the path through (k, 1), as shown in Figure
3.
Figure 3: Separation for (w0, w2j , w
2
l )
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Then, w2j |(X1) and w2l |(X1) are dependent, conditional on w0. This follows
formally from the definition of the dependence network, which implies that H
is the minimal I −map (see Koller & Friedman (2009), theorem 4.6).
The same argument applies in general: w0 separates wti |(Xt−1) and wtj |(Xt−1)
if and only if the shortest path between i and j in the dependence network is
greater than t, i.e. iff ρd(i, j) > t. QED
Proof (of Proposition 4). The proof is based on Dorea & Pereira (2006).
From Theorems 2 and 3, it is sufficient to show that there exists a probability
µt, an integer mt ≥ 1, and constants αt < 1/2 and βt > 0 such that for any
A ∈ Bn, µt(A) > αt implies that
inf
w∈W
Pmt(w0, (Xmt−1), A) ≥ βt (5)
We have:
Pmt(w0, (Xmt−1), A) =
∫
W
P (w,Xmt−1, A)Pmt−1(w0, (Xmt−2), dw)
≥ P (b,Xmt−1, A)Pmt−1(w0, (Xmt−2),b)
≥ P (b,Xmt−1, A)δ
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 5. Letting µt(A) = P (b,X
mt−1, A)
completes the proof. QED
Proof (of Proposition 5). The proof follows directly from the successive
application of theorem 4.3.8 from Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002).
Proof (of Proposition 6).
Monotone Process:
First, note that ω is monotone (see Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002), theorems 3.3.10,
3.3.11 and 3.3.13). For any i ∈ N , we have
wt+1i = max{Dδb+ (1−Dδ)wti , Dγωti}.
Then, φ is -monotone from Mu¨ller & Stoyan (2002), theorem 3.3.10.
Association: This follows directly from the specification of εti.
Positive Distribution and Layoff Probability:
Every individual has a positive probability of being laid off, as well as re-
ceiving a job offer, and the distribution of offers has full support on W . This
implies that Assumptions 3 and 5 hold.
Dependence Network: Assumption 4 holds for Gd = Gs. QED
6.2. Tables
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean∗∗ Std. Dev.
All (N=956)
Age 40.956 9.374
Education level∗ 3.528 1.617
Single 0.227 0.419
Health status 0.084 0.278
Employment 0.938 0.241
Hourly wage 11.571 6.059
Log of hourly wage 2.185 0.736
Regional unemployment rate 6.69 2.267
Women (N=444)
Age 41.265 9.182
Education level∗ 3.396 1.588
Single 0.234 0.424
Health status 0.08 0.271
Employment 0.957 0.203
Hourly wage 10.069 5.261
Log of hourly wage 2.098 0.649
Regional unemployment rate 6.728 2.274
∗Education is coded in seven levels.
∗∗Mean over the nine periods (1992-2008).
Table 2: Summary statistics for the number of declared friends
Number of friends 0 1 2 3
All 2.1% 5.6% 92.3%
Female 1.3% 5.0% 93.7%
Number of employed friends 0 1 2 3
All 2.7% 12.2% 31.8% 53.3%
Female 2.6% 13.6% 39.0% 44.9%
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Table 3: Estimates
lnwti RE RE with IC RE with IC
Equi-correlation CRE
lnwt−1i 0.127 0.107 0.084
(0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
Et−1i 0.013 0.013 0.028
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 0.0002 0.0006 0.025
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.0004
(0.00005) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Female -0.20 -0.144 -0.111
(0.01) (0.027) (0.046)
Education 0.095 0.087 0.100
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Single -0.004 -0.0004 -0.057
(0.02) (0.028) (0.032)
Health status -0.05 -0.0050 -0.057
(0.04) (0.04) (0.048)
Local unemployment rate -0.057 -0.063 -0.050
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
lnw0i 0.148 -0.140
(0.016) (0.086)
Single -0.030
(0.114)
Health status -1.96
(0.156)
Unemployment rate -0.059
(0.029)
lnw0i × Single 0.075
(0.049)
lnw0i ×Health status 0.964
(0.074)
lnw0i ×Unemployment rate 0.041
(0.014)
Constant 1.96 1.71 1.671
(0.10) (0.087) (0.212)
δ 0.147 0.147 0.147
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
γ 0.638 0.643 0.682
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
σu 0.32 0.32 0.321
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
ση 0.34 0.34 0.341
(0.009) (0.01) (0.011)
Log likelihood -3953 -3936 -3829
N = 663
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Table 4: Estimates by gender
Three friends One, two or three friends
Female All Female All
lnwt−1i 0.065 0.084 0.068 0.075
(0.031) (0.018) (0.033) (0.014)
Et−1i 0.041 0.028 0.038 0.012
(0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011)
Age -0.021 0.025 -0.010 0.030
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0017) (0.0005)
Age2 0.00001 -0.0004 0.000009 -0.0006
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Female -0.111 0.048
(0.046) (0.025)
Education 0.052 0.100 0.046 0.106
(0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Single -0.049 -0.057 -0.025 -0.083
(0.045) (0.032) (0.040) (0.027)
Health status -0.105 -0.057 -0.029 -0.001
(0.065) (0.048) (0.054) (0.036)
Unemployment rate -0.057 -0.050 -0.053 -0.0512
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
lnw0i 0.715 -0.140 0.102 0.088
(0.153) (0.086) (0.210) (0.068)
Single -0.544 -0.030 0.213 0.366
(0.334) (0.114) (0.240) (0.080)
Health status -2.021 -1.963 -2.248 -2.431
(0.301) (0.156) (0.230) (0.129)
Unemployment rate 0.345 -0.059 0.054 0.022
(0.040) (0.029) (0.073) (0.021)
lnw0i × Single 0.358 0.075 -0.128 -0.096
(0.237) (0.049) (0.148) (0.042)
lnw0i ×Health status 1.000 0.964 0.921 1.118
(0.189) (0.074) (0.129) (0.063)
lnw0i ×Unemployment rate -0.103 0.041 0.006 0.017
(0.023) (0.014) (0.043) (0.012)
Constant 0.369 1.671 1.738 1.060
(0.332) (0.212) (0.392) (0.138)
δ 0.139 0.147 0.143 0.149
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
γ 0.656 0.682 0.669 0.669
(0.023) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013)
σu 0.298 0.321 0.309 0.309
(.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
ση 0.347 0.341 0.347 0.357
(0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009)
Log likelihood -1814 -3829 -2569 -5572
N 314 663 444 956
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Table 5: Joint model of the number of employed friends and wage dynamics
lnwti E
t
i
lnwt−1i 0.071 lnw
t−1
i 0.236
(0.029) (0.054)
Et−1i 0.056 E
t−1
i 0.631
(0.018) (0.048)
Age 0.005 Unemployment rate 0.014
(0.002) (0.013)
Age2 -0.0003 a0 -0.580
(0.00002) (0.200)
Education 0.047 a1 0.693
(0.012) (0.189)
Single -0.024 a2 2.190
(0.044) (0.186)
Health status -0.113 σν 0.337
(0.068) (0.016)
Unemployment rate -0.056 ρ -0.649
(0.007) (0.589)
δ 0.139
(0.008)
γ 0.658
(0.023)
σu 0.298
(0.009)
Constant 1.971
(0.271)
Single -0.688
(0.243)
Health status -1.696
(0.402)
Unemployment rate 0.018
(0.046)
lnw0i -0.259
(0.154)
lnw0i × Single 0.436
(0.118)
lnw0i ×Health status 0.853
(0.189)
lnw0i ×Unemployment rate 0.046
(0.026)
σα 0.601
(0.422)
Log likelihood -3843 N 314
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